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PICKING UP ON WHAT’S GOING UNDERGROUND:
AUSTRALIA SHOULD EXEMPT CARBON CAPTURE AND
GEO-SEQUESTRATION FROM PART IIIA OF THE
TRADE PRACTICES ACT
Adam M. Andrews†
Abstract: Australia has identified carbon capture and geo-sequestration (“CCS”) as
a partial solution to the problem of global warming. CCS involves capturing carbon
dioxide from large point-source emitters, such as power plants, and injecting it deep
below ground level for disposal. Australia has not yet enacted CCS-specific regulations.
As it stands now, Australia’s third-party access law, Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act,
creates regulatory uncertainty for CCS infrastructure projects and will deter investment in
the industry. This regulatory uncertainty results from the ambiguous criteria used to
determine whether a piece of infrastructure is appropriate for third-party access.
Legislators could address the ambiguity of Part IIIA by creating an industry specific
third-party access regime for CCS. However, doing so would be difficult without
foreknowledge of how the industry will develop, would generate significant compliance
costs, and would also likely deter investment. In the near term, CCS should be exempted
from Part IIIA altogether to encourage private companies to invest in CCS. Exemption
would provide investors with the expectation that they can recoup the costs of their
investments without submitting to mandatory access requirements.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Australia has identified a process called “carbon capture and geosequestration” (“CCS”) as a viable way to both address the problem of
global warming and continue to use fossil fuels for energy. 1 CCS is the
process of first trapping flue gases from large point-source emitters, then
capturing the carbon dioxide from those gases, compressing that carbon
dioxide, transporting it, and finally, injecting it deep underground for
disposal.2 CCS depends upon established science but has not yet been

†

Juris Doctor expected 2009, University of Washington School of Law. The author would like to
thank Professor Brendan Sweeney for his explication of Australian competition law. He was invaluable in
refining this piece and in fleshing out the treatment of the Trade Practices Act. Specifically, he pointed out
that the abuse of market power provisions contained in Section 46 complement the third-party access
regime of Part IIIA. The author would also like to thank Professor Dongsheng Zang, Professor Dwight
Drake, Professor Veronica Taylor, Stephanie Kotecki, Tom and Lauren Andrews, and the Braintrust at 338
NE 51st for their ongoing support and boundless wisdom.
1
Australian Greenhouse Office, Dep’t of the Environment and Heritage, Commonwealth of
Australia, Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage Fact Sheet (2006), http://www.greenhouse.gov.au/ccs/
publications/pubs/fs-ccs.pdf.
2
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and
Storage, 19 (B. Mertz et. al., eds., 2005) [hereinafter IPCC Report].
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implemented on a significant scale.3 The cost of capturing carbon dioxide
remains a serious obstacle to widespread adoption of CCS, but in the minds
of many scientists and politicians this obstacle is surmountable when
considered against the backdrop of the alternatives.4 Because world energy
forecasts predict continued global reliance on fossil fuels for decades to
come,5 CCS stands as an important mitigation strategy over the medium
term.6
Many CCS projects around the world are in development.7 The
largest of these projects will be the Gorgon development just off the
northwest coast of Australia, expected to be operational in 2010.8 The
natural gas fields there contain between 12% and 14% carbon dioxide.9
Normally, a natural gas developer would simply vent that carbon dioxide
into the atmosphere.10 Instead, the petroleum companies operating Gorgon
will sequester the carbon dioxide into a saline aquifer deep below nearby
Barrow Island.11
Australian lawmakers have begun to develop state and federal legal
frameworks to govern the nascent CCS industry. At the federal level, the
Commonwealth issued a set of Guiding Regulatory Principles to give
direction to the various states in developing consistent laws for CCS.12
More recently, the Commonwealth suggested that federal CCS legislation
will be based on the Offshore Petroleum Act.13 Amending the Offshore
Petroleum Act would be in line with developments at the state level in
Queensland and South Australia.14 In drafting future laws, legislators face
the dilemma of how to regulate a new industry.
3
Int’l Energy Agency [IEA], Legal Aspects of Storing CO2, 14 (2005), available at
http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/co2_legal.pdf.
4
See Matthew Wald, In a Test of Capturing Carbon Dioxide, Perhaps a Way to Temper Global
Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2007, at C3.
5
International Energy Outlook 2007, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, DOE/EIA0484 (2007), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/0484(2007).pdf.
6
IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 20-21.
7
Id. at 33.
8
IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme, Projects Database – Gorgon Gas Development,
http://www.co2captureandstorage.info/project_specific.php?project_id=122 (last visited Dec. 29, 2007).
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
See Barrow Island Act, 2003 (W. Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/
consol_act/bia2003145/index.html.
12
Aust. Gov’t, Dep’t of Indus., Tourism, and Res., Carbon Dioxide Capture and Geological Storage
(CCS)
Development
of
Regulatory
Framework,
http://www.ret.gov.au/Industry/Coal/Pages/
CarbonDioxideCaptureandGeologicalStorageCCSDevelopmentofRegulatoryFramework.aspx (last visited
Feb. 11, 2008).
13
Id.
14
See Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act, 2004, §§ 12, 13 (Qld.) (Queensland added
carbon dioxide to the definition of petroleum in its petroleum law. As a result carbon dioxide may be
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This Comment considers the application of Part IIIA of Australia’s
Trade Practices Act (“TPA”) to the CCS industry. Part IIIA is Australia’s
default third-party access law and could be applied to infrastructure in any
industry.15 Part IIIA regulates a third-party private company’s access to
critical infrastructure, and allows for the creation of specific access regimes
for industries prone to natural monopolies.16 This Comment argues that Part
IIIA creates regulatory uncertainty for CCS investors and will deter
investment in the CCS industry. Part IIIA was enacted to support
competitive marketplaces.17 For a new industry like CCS, any benefits to
competition in the future are highly speculative, while the negative impacts
for the investment climate are current and concrete. The uncertainty created
by Part IIIA heaps risk on an industry whose future is already plagued with
unknowns.
This Comment makes two basic assumptions. First, it assumes that
Australia will establish a carbon tax or cap-and-trade scheme that attaches a
price to emitting carbon dioxide.18 Until emitting carbon dioxide costs
money, there cannot be any significant market for services that avoid
emissions. Without a market, Part IIIA cannot promote market competition
through third-party access.19
Australia will likely establish a carbon tax or cap-and-trade scheme.
In December of 2007, Kevin Rudd, Australia’s new Prime Minister, ratified
the Kyoto Protocol, signaling to the world that Australia will redouble its
efforts to address climate change.20 The new government announced that by
2050 it will reduce emissions by 60%.21 The centerpiece of that strategy is a
nationwide emissions cap-and-trade scheme that Rudd will put in place in
2010.22 Rudd also renewed the government’s pledge to pursue clean coal.

transported and injected underground according to the standards laid out for natural gas transmission and
storage.); Petroleum Act, 2000, part 1, div. 3 (S. Austl.) (South Australia took similar measures to allow
transport and storage of carbon dioxide under its petroleum law.).
15
See RUSSELL V. MILLER, MILLER’S ANNOTATED TRADE PRACTICES ACT 186 (27th ed. 2006).
16
See Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. IIIA, § 44(G)(2)-(4) (Austl.); see, e.g., National Third Party
Access Code for Natural Gas Pipeline Systems, 1 (1997) (establishing a third party access regime for
natural gas pipelines, enacted by each of Australia’s state governments), available at
http://www.coderegistrar.sa.gov.au/code.htm.
17
MILLER, supra note 15, at 185.
18
I base this premise on the pledge of the new government in Australia to enact a cap and trade
scheme, see infra notes 20-24 and accompyaning text.
19
See infra Part III.
20
Media Statement, Kevin Rudd, Ratifying the Kyoto Protocol (Dec. 3, 2007), available at
http://www.labor.com.au/media/1207/mspm030.php.
21
Id.
22
Id.
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The net effect of these policies will be to put a price on emitting
carbon dioxide and to encourage zero-emission electricity production, for
example, burning coal for electricity in combination with CCS. The capand-trade scheme will slowly ratchet up the price of emissions as the
government lowers the cap to meet its 2050 60% reduction target.23 The
Rudd government will likely model its scheme on the design suggested by
the National Emissions Trading Taskforce.24
Second, this Comment assumes that Australia will rely primarily on
private capital to develop CCS infrastructure and provide CCS services. It is
likely that Australia will rely on private capital because of the trend away
from government owned enterprise and toward a reliance on the market to
provide services.25 If, however, the Australian government does take a
major role in financing CCS services and infrastructure, then the thesis of
this Comment—that Part IIIA deters private investment—becomes moot.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part II of this Comment
provides background on Australia’s third-party access law and CCS to
explain the purpose of Part IIIA of the TPA and its intended purview. Part
III demonstrates that the criteria for access provided by Part IIIA do not
generate firm expectations as to whether third-party access to CCS
infrastructure will be required. Part IV critically examines Australia’s access
framework for natural gas pipelines to show that developing a similar regime
for CCS is premature and creates an unjustifiable regulatory burden. Part V
argues that the ambiguity of Part IIIA’s criteria and the regulatory burden
posed by an industry specific regime necessitate the exemption of CCS from
Part IIIA.

23
National Emissions Trading Taskforce, Possible Design for a National Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Trading Scheme xv (Discussion Paper, 2006) [hereinafter NETT], available at
http://www.emissionstrading.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/2017/Discussion_Paper__Full_document.pdf. A detailed discussion of such schemes is beyond the reach of this paper, but a few
points are worth noting. First, the emissions trading scheme will focus on stationary energy producers.
Second, the initial allocation of emission permits will be a function of current usage with a remainder sold
by auction. Third, market forces will determine the value of the permits and in turn the associated cost of
emitting carbon dioxide. Fourth, the price of emitting carbon dioxide and in turn the incentive to sequester
it will depend on the level the cap is set at, the pace at which the cap declines, and the penalty for emitting
without a permit. Estimates range from a price of between $5 and $15 per ton initially with an eventual
price between $25 and $35 by 2060. At these levels, CCS (using current technology) would only be viable
for lower cost installations.
24
BAKER & MCKENZIE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND RENEWABLE ENERGY: A NEW ERA FOR AUSTRALIA,
4 (2007), http://www.bakernet.com/NR/rdonlyres/7CD97110-B285-4694-BD2B-0313F85E78E7/42983/
Climate_Change_Implications.pdf; see NETT, supra note 23.
25
See infra Part II.
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AUSTRALIA ENACTED PART IIIA OF THE TRADE PRACTICES ACT TO
GUARD AGAINST MONOPOLY AS IT PRIVATIZED CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE

Australia enacted Part IIIA, its primary third-party access law, as one
of many reforms intended to foster competition in the Australian economy.26
Part IIIA regulates services provided via essential pieces of infrastructure.27
If a service meets the statutory criteria established by Part IIIA, the service
provider becomes subject to the regulator’s determination of whether access
should be granted and on what terms.28 An airport is a classic example of
essential infrastructure. In that context, access would be granted to the
services provided by the airport—use of runways, taxiways and other airport
facilities.29 If the service provider and access seeker cannot agree on
mutually agreeable terms arbitration will commence and terms will be
imposed by regulators.30
A.

Australia Liberalized Trade and Privatized State-Owned Enterprises,
Sparking Fears of Private Monopolies

Over the last twenty years, Australia has moved away from relying on
government-run companies to supply services toward a more laissez faire
approach characterized by private companies operating in a competitive
market. Historically, government ownership of commercial, financial, and
industrial enterprises was a major feature of the Australian economy.31
Australian governments at the state and federal level owned and controlled
the major part of the telecommunications, electricity, airports, gas
production, banking, and railways industries.32
When the Labour Party took power in 1983, it bowed to public
pressure by introducing measures to liberalize Australia’s economy.33
Australia floated its currency, deregulated its financial markets,34 and
substantially reduced external tariffs.35 Gains from these liberalization
26

MILLER, supra note 15, at 185.
Id. at 183-84.
28
Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. IIIA, §§ 44H, 44S (Austl.).
29
See infra Part II(A).
30
See Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. IIIA, § 44V (Austl.).
31
R. C. MASCARENHAS, GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND: THE
POLITICS OF ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING 263 (1996).
32
Id. at 271.
33
Id. at 67-70, 269.
34
National Competition Council, Overview of National Competition Policy, http://www.ncc.gov.au/
articleZone.asp?articleZoneID=16 (last visited Dec. 27, 2007).
35
STEPHEN BELL & BRIAN HEAD, STATE, ECONOMY, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN AUSTRALIA 235 (1994).
27
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measures of the 1980s in Australia fueled the privatization and competitive
reform efforts of the 1990s.36 From 1990 to 1997, sales of public assets in
Australia totaled about 61 billion AUD, half of those at the federal level.37
Privatization generated anxiety that the now private owners of unique
infrastructure would operate as monopolists.38 Under government control,
the facilities and infrastructure had been managed partially as instruments of
social welfare with services provided equitably.39 Critics feared that after
privatization, service providers would try to maximize profits and that,
ultimately, consumers would suffer.40
In 1992, a coalition of Australian governments formed a commission
to consider the possibility of a national competition policy.41 Frederick
Hilmer was appointed its chair. He and his colleagues authored a report
(“Hilmer Report”), which recommended a program of competitive reforms
for Australia.42 The Hilmer Report argued that Australia needed to create a
legal regime to establish access rights to “essential facilities.”43 The
“essential facilities” contemplated in the Hilmer Report were those that
could not be economically duplicated.44 Third-party access rights were
envisioned as a way to promote competition in markets for services that
relied upon these essential facilities.45
A review of a recent case brought under Part IIIA will give shape to
the concept of an essential facility. In Re Virgin Blue Airlines, (“Virgin
Blue”) the airline sought declaration and access to Sydney International
Airport.46 Virgin Blue sought the right to use the airport facilities so that it
could provide air travel for domestic passengers.47 To provide such services,
the airline required access to the runways, taxiways, parking aprons, and
terminals at Sydney International.48

36

MASCARENHAS, supra note 31, at 67-70, 270-71.
Reserve Bank of Australia, Bulletin: Privatisation in Australia, 7 (Dec. 1997), available at
http://www.rba.gov.au/PublicationsAndResearch/Bulletin/bu_dec97/bu_1297_2.pdf.
38
See FREDERICK G. HILMER, NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY: REPORT BY THE INDEPENDENT
COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY xxx-xxxv (Australian Government Publishing Service 1993).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
National Competition Council, supra note 34.
42
HILMER, supra note 38, at xxi-xxxv.
43
Id. at 239-68.
44
Id. at 239.
45
Id.
46
Re Virgin Blue Airlines Pty Ltd. (2005) Austl. Competition Tribunal 5, available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/ACompT/2005/5.html.
47
Id. ¶ 4.
48
Id. ¶ 8.
37
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The Sydney International Airport qualifies as an “essential facility”
because it is the major airport serving Sydney. It would be difficult and
expensive to build an airport to compete with Sydney International. More
importantly, it would be socially inefficient to build another airport when
Sydney International can meet demand for air travel. Naturally, any airline
that wants to provide air travel to and from Sydney must have access to the
airport. In Virgin Blue, the Australian Competition Tribunal (“ACT”)
ultimately required the airport to provide access to Virgin under the
provisions of Part IIIA.49
The Virgin Blue case demonstrates the role that third-party access law
can have in enabling competition.50 In the absence of rights for third parties
to gain access to infrastructure, the owner of a critical piece of infrastructure
has the opportunity to act as a monopolist and set monopoly prices. The
immediate effect of inflated pricing is that consumers will pay more for the
service in question than they would if multiple competing airports supplied
the market.51 Such anti-competitive effects are not limited to the market for
airport services, however. In Virgin Blue, the ACT declared the airport
services and granted access to Virgin in order to promote competition in the
market for air travel.52 In the absence of effective third-party access law, the
owner of an “essential facility” can stifle competition in related markets that
depends on access to deliver services. Without access to the runways,
taxiways, parking aprons, and airport terminals at Sydney International,
Virgin was unable to compete with other airlines in the market for air travel
services.53
B.

Part IIIA of the TPA Ensures Competition Where Monopolies Exist

In 1995, amidst widespread privatization of infrastructure, the
Commonwealth enacted Part IIIA of the TPA.54 Part IIIA acts as the default
third-party access law for Australia and applies unless supplanted by a more
specific industry access code.55
The ACT has explained that Part IIIA operates on the assumption that
“competition, efficiency and public interest are increased by overriding the
exclusive rights of the owners of ‘monopoly’ facilities to determine the
49

Id. ¶ 25.
Id. ¶¶ 1-25.
51
This conclusion flows from basic economic theory regarding price setting in monopolistic versus
competitive markets.
52
See Virgin Blue Airlines, supra note 46, ¶ 20.
53
Id. ¶¶ 19-25.
54
Competition Policy Reform Act, 1995, § 59 (Austl.).
55
Trade Practices Act of 1974, Pt. IIIA, § 44G (Austl.).
50
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terms and conditions on which they will supply their services.”56 Part IIIA
focuses on facilities “of national significance that it would be uneconomic to
duplicate or replicate and that supply a service, access to which would
promote competition.”57 In 2006, the Parliament clarified Part IIIA’s
objectives:
Part IIIA is intended to “promote the economically
efficient . . . use of and investment in infrastructure . . . thereby promoting
effective competition in upstream and downstream markets.”58 Part IIIA
also establishes a “framework . . . to encourage a consistent approach to
access regulation in each industry.”59
Part IIIA establishes three separate mechanisms to regulate third-party
access. First, an individual facility may be “declared” and thereby subjected
to the third-party access rights set forth in Part IIIA.60
Second, states may author their own access regimes.61 This process
begins with a state submitting its regime to the National Competition
Council (“NCC”), which then offers its recommendation as to certification
of a state regime.62 The relevant government minister63 receives that
recommendation and then makes the ultimate decision to certify the state’s
regime as “effective.”64 If the minister does certify it, the regime becomes
the controlling access regime for its subject matter within that jurisdiction.65
Multiple states may also enact and seek certification of identical regimes to
create multi-jurisdictional access regimes.66 In 1997, for example, the states
passed identical laws to establish the National Third-Party Access Code for
Natural Gas Pipeline Systems (“Gas Code”), which created a nationwide
access regime for natural gas pipelines.67
Third, facility owners may propose their own third-party access
arrangement by submitting an application to the Australian Competition and
56

Re Australian Union of Students (1997) 147 A.L.R. 458, ¶ 28.
Id.
58
Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. IIIA, § 44AA (Austl.).
59
Id.
60
MILLER, supra note 15, at 187.
61
Id. at 190-91.
62
Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. IIIA, § 44M (Austl.).
63
NATIONAL COMPETITION COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL ACCESS REGIME: A GUIDE TO PART IIIA OF
THE TRADE PRACTICES ACT OF 1974 PART B, 8 (2002), available at http://www.ncc.gov.au/pdf/DEGeGu002a.pdf. Normally, this will be a Commonwealth minister, usually a treasury official, but where the
service in controversy is provided by a state government, that state’s chief minister will make the
determination.
64
Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. IIIA, §§ 44M, 44N (Austl.).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
National Access Code for Natural Gas Pipeline Systems (1997), available at
http://www.coderegistrar.sa.gov.au/code.htm.
57

MARCH 2008

CARBON CAPTURE UNDER AUSTRALIAN ACCESS LAW

415

Consumer Commission (“ACCC”).68 This Comment does not explicitly
consider the implications of owner-proposed access arrangements for the
CCS industry. Access arrangements must be approved by largely the same
criteria as if they were reached by the declaration process.69 Also, the terms
of such access arrangements must accord with the same pricing principles as
those that would be set by regulators via the declaration process.70 The net
result is that a service provider does not have any real incentive to commit to
terms preemptively in an access arrangement when the possibility exists that
the service will never be declared. As a result, the declaration process
provides the real incentive to act or not. For this reason, this Comment
focuses on the first two mechanisms available under Part IIIA: declaration
and certification. This Comment considers each of these two mechanisms in
turn, demonstrating that applying either to CCS would deter investment.
III.

LARGE AND UNIQUE PIECES OF CCS INFRASTRUCTURE WILL MEET THE
CRITERIA FOR “DECLARATION” UNDER PART IIIA OF THE TPA

Part IIIA can only be used to obtain third-party access where the
service and corresponding facility meet six statutory criteria.71 Taken as a
whole, these criteria for “declaration” are too amorphous to provide
sufficient certainty for private investors embarking on CCS infrastructure
projects.72 Because declaration may have serious consequences for how a
service provider operates, the prospect of declaration makes it difficult to
predict costs and revenues. One important relationship, however, does
surface: the larger the infrastructure, the more likely it will meet the
statutory criteria for declaration. Specifically, pipelines and sequestration
sites will be more likely candidates than capture facilities.73
A.

Declaration Is the Basic Mechanism for Allowing Third-Party Access

The default mechanism for regulating third-party access under Part
IIIA is by “declaration.” “Declaration” grants a third party the right to
negotiate with the service provider to set the terms of access to the service.74
68

MILLER, supra note 15, at 191.
Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. IIIA, § 44ZZA (Austl.)
70
Id. § 44ZZA(3)(ab).
71
Id. § 44G.
72
See infra Part III.
73
See infra Part III.C.
74
NATIONAL COMPETITION COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL ACCESS REGIME: A GUIDE TO PART IIIA OF
THE TRADE PRACTICES ACT 1974 PART A 9 (2002), available at http://www.ncc.gov.au/pdf/DEGeGu001a.pdf. It is worth mentioning that access may be granted under other laws. For example, under § 46 of
the Trade Practices Act courts may grant access, but only with a showing of intentional abuse of market
69
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A “service” for the purposes of Part IIIA means: any service provided by
means of a facility, including the use of infrastructure, the handling or
transportation of goods or people, and communications infrastructure.75 Part
IIIA offers no definition of facility, but the courts have made clear that the
term requires some physical asset.76
For example, in Re Sydney
International Airport, (“Sydney International”) the ACT “declared” freight
handling services, and it identified the entire Sydney Airport as the facility
attached to those services.77
The process of declaration has two steps. First, an application is made
to the NCC.78
The NCC reviews the application and makes a
recommendation.79 The appropriate Minister takes the application along
with the NCC’s recommendation, reviews it and makes the final decision
whether to “declare” the service and subject it to the third-party access
requirements of Part IIIA.80 The ACT hears appeals of declaration
decisions81 and issues binding rulings.82
Once the appropriate Minister declares a service, the owner of that
service has two options. Either it can reach a mutually satisfactory
agreement with the access seeker or it can submit to a binding arbitration
presided over by the ACCC.83 Under the second scenario, the ACCC’s
arbitration decision dictates the terms of access for the service.84 If the
owner can show that an access arrangement is infeasible, the ACCC may not
require access.85

power. Part IIIA allows for access without proving anti-competitive behavior has taken place. See Trade
Practices Act, 1974, § 46 (Austl.).
75
MILLER, supra note 15, at 189.
76
Id. at 191.
77
Re Sydney International Airport (2000) Austl. Competition Tribunal 1, ¶ 1, available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/ACompT/2000/1.html.
78
MILLER, supra note 15, at 199-200.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 187.
81
Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. IIIA, §§ 44K, 44L (Austl.).
82
See id.
83
See id. § 44S.
84
See id. § 44V.
85
Id. § 44V.
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The Six Declaration Criteria Under Part IIIA Are Too Ambiguous to
Allow Investors to Determine in Advance Whether a Piece of
Infrastructure Will Be Declared

Both the NCC and the relevant Minister evaluate the application for
declaration based on six criteria intended to ensure that granting access will
actually provide a net competitive benefit.86 These criteria are:
(1) Access to the service must materially promote competition
in at least one market other than the market for the service;
(2) It must be “uneconomical” to develop another facility to
provide the service;
(3) The facility must be of national significance either with
regard to its size, its importance to commerce, or its importance
to the national economy;
(4) The requested access must not pose an undue risk to human
health or safety;
(5) Access to the service must not already be covered by
another effective access regime; and
(6) The requested access must not be contrary to the public
interest.87
The ambiguity of these six criteria creates a real problem for an investor
trying to predict whether a project will meet them. To put the problem
differently, the criteria are so broad that they seem to give regulators
applying them a great deal of discretion.
Before examining these criteria in greater depth, it is important to
identify and describe the CCS services and facilities that could be subject to
declaration under Part IIIA. CCS projects have three phases, each of which
will likely be considered a separate service for the purposes of Part IIIA.
The CCS process begins with capturing the carbon dioxide from a large
point-source emitter.88 A gas processing facility will be required to separate
carbon dioxide from water and the other flue gases.89 The second phase of
CCS, and second potential service will be the transportation of carbon
86
87
88
89

Id. §§ 44G, 44H.
Id. § 44G. These six criteria are paraphrased here, but the essential language remains unchanged.
IPCC Report, supra note 2, at 19.
See id. at 24-26.
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dioxide. A pipeline and supporting compression facilities are necessary to
transmit the carbon dioxide under pressure.90 The third phase of CCS will
be geo-sequestration services. A number of facilities, including an injection
facility, monitoring equipment, and the actual subterranean storage site are
essential to supply this service.91 For each of the three phases of CCS, there
will be a service and related facilities that may be subjected to Part IIIA
requirements.
1.

If CCS Facilities Operate as Natural Monopolies, Then Increased
Access Would “Promote Competition,” and Declaration Will Be More
Likely

To satisfy the first criterion for declaration under Part IIIA, granting
access to the service must “promote competition” in a market other than the
one for the service.92 The ACT begins this analysis by defining relevant
markets.93 In Duke Eastern Gas Pipeline Pty Ltd, (“Duke Gas”) the ACT
defined the market in question as transmission of natural gas.94 Gas
exploration, production, processing, distribution, and sales were all related
but as distinct markets.95 By analogy, given the functional similarity
between CCS and natural gas transmission, each stage of the CCS process
likely would qualify as a separate market under the first criterion.
Increased third-party access will only promote competition if the firm
that controls the facility exercises a large degree of market power within the
market being examined.96 Two factors determine a firm’s market power: the
degree of control of the market and the susceptibility of the service to
substitution.97 The more of the market a single firm controls, the more
market power it has. The fewer substitutes there are for a service, the more
market power the service provider has.

90

Id. at 29-31. Other means of transportation are possible, but pipelines represent the lowest cost
option assuming a significant volume of carbon dioxide.
91
Id. at 31-35.
92
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road transport were poor substitutes for rail transport).
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For example, in Re Specialised Container Transport, (“Specialised
Transport”) the NCC recommended declaration of the freight services
provided by a railway linking Broken Hill with Sydney.98 The NCC
concluded that the Rail Access Corporation (“RAC”) had the requisite
market power on two grounds.99 First, RAC wholly owned all rail lines in
New South Wales (demonstrating a high degree of market control).100
Second, the NCC determined that the alternative modes of freight—air, sea,
and road—were poor substitutes for rail freight and, therefore, were not
direct competitors (low susceptibility to substitution).101 By contrast, in
Duke Gas, the ACCC decided that competition would not be promoted, in
large part, because other pipeline routes were available to move gas to the
market in question.102 In essence, Duke did not have a large enough share of
market power to qualify its pipeline for declaration under the first criterion.
The logic of the Duke Gas decision suggests that increased access to
certain CCS services would likely promote competition in related markets.103
First, a firm’s ability to compete in any of the three CCS service markets
depends upon its access to the other related upstream and downstream
markets. A firm will not be able to provide carbon dioxide separation
services unless it can guarantee access to a pipeline and sequestration site.
As a result, CCS service providers in one market will have a strong case for
access to the services and infrastructure of a related CCS service provider.
Second, CCS firms may have significant market power. The
investment costs associated with CCS infrastructure will be large and will
raise a serious barrier to market entry. Pipelines are expensive to build, as
are wells to drill. Competition will also depend upon the availability of high
quality storage sites in proximity to urban areas.104 If few good
sequestration sites exist, then competition in that market will be necessarily
limited. Over the near term, demand for CCS services will also be quite
limited. As a result of this, and the fact that CCS infrastructure will require a
large amount of capital, a single provider will tend to dominate early on.
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Market power also depends on whether the service can be substituted
by another competing service.105 CCS will likely be relatively immune to
substitution because no other process takes carbon dioxide from a pointsource and permanently disposes of it. Terrestrial carbon sequestration
provides another means of trapping carbon dioxide, but because it absorbs
ambient carbon dioxide and does not have the same guarantees of
permanence, it is not a perfect substitute.106 Market power will also depend
upon the availability of alternative services within the CCS industry.107 For
example, pipeline operators may have to compete with freight companies to
provide carbon dioxide transportation services.108 But, given that pipeline
transport is the lowest cost option, there will likely be few competitive
substitutes in that market.109
Under the first criterion, CCS services may be good candidates for
declaration. First, the three markets for CCS services will be closely-tied;
service providers in one market will depend upon access to the other
connected markets to compete. Second, because CCS services will be costly
to provide, it will be common for markets to be served by a single provider.
As CCS develops and more participants enter CCS markets, market power
will tend to decline, and these conclusions may not hold. As a result, the
application of the first criterion depends on the time frame considered.
2.

CCS Infrastructure Will Likely Be “Uneconomical” to Duplicate

The second criterion for declaration requires that the facility related to
the service be “uneconomical” to duplicate.110 The NCC and ACT have
discussed and attempted to clarify this facially ambiguous standard. In
Sydney International, the ACT explained that the “uneconomical to
duplicate test should be construed in terms of the associated costs and
benefits of development for society as a whole.”111 In Duke Gas, the ACT
accepted NCC’s proposal that where a single facility can satisfy market
demand at a lower cost than multiple facilities, it would be uneconomical to
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duplicate that facility.112 This concept of a socially efficient single provider
is captured by the term “natural monopoly.”113
Applying the uneconomical to duplicate criterion to the CCS context
requires some speculation about the character of the market for geosequestering carbon dioxide. However, even without certainty of what
carbon regulations will look like, useful comparisons can be drawn among
the different types of CCS facilities. Technical literature seems to assume
that individual carbon capture facilities would attach to each large carbon
dioxide emitter.114 Attaching capture facilities to emitters avoids the
problem of having to transport the raw flue gas, which only contains
between 3% and 12% carbon dioxide.115 As a result, capture infrastructure
will not qualify for declaration under the second criterion.
CCS pipelines are expensive to construct costing around $1 million
U.S. dollars per meter in diameter, per kilometer.116 The cost of transmitting
carbon dioxide calculated per unit of gas descends as the quantity of gas
transmitted increases.117 This means that, all other things being equal, a
large pipeline moves gas less expensively than two smaller pipelines.
However, the size of a given CCS pipeline will also be a function of the size
of the storage sites available for sequestration. Widely-dispersed smaller
storage sites will necessitate multiple smaller pipelines. Clustered storage
sites, or the existence of only one large viable storage site, would both tend
to favor a single larger pipeline.118 Of course, the potential for multiple CCS
pipelines presupposes a longer timeframe and a robust demand for
transmission services. Over the near term, because demand will be low, and
the economies of scale are large, a market will almost certainly be most
efficiently served by a single pipeline.
It is unclear whether underground storage sites appropriate for CCS
will exhibit the characteristics of a natural monopoly. A variety of different
geologic formations seem appropriate for CCS so that multiple viable
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options should exist in a reasonable proximity to emissions sources.119
However, the availability of alternative sites does not mean that using
multiple sites will be efficient. If a CCS pipeline qualifies as a natural
monopoly, then it will also be most efficient to sequester carbon dioxide at a
single location.120 A single storage location does not necessarily imply a
single storage site. The property interests in subterranean storage capacity at
a particular location may be divided among various property owners so that
multiple injection wells operated by different companies is conceivable.121
More likely though, the property interest will be held by a single entity122
and the allocation of property rights to storage capacity will only reinforce
the tendency for geo-sequestration facilities to behave as natural monopolies
in a given CCS market.
3.

Larger CCS Infrastructure May Be “Nationally Significant”

Under the third criterion, a facility cannot be declared unless it is of
“national significance” in either size, importance to commerce, or general
importance to the national economy.123 Historically, this criterion has had a
relatively straightforward application. Large, unique pieces of infrastructure
like airports124 and railways125 have qualified easily. The most important
element of the “national significance” criterion in the CCS context is the
question of importance to commerce. In Re Australian Union of Students,
the ACT refused to declare access to a computer network because the
theoretical economic benefit was negligible as a contribution to Australia’s
119
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storage basins; discussing the various geologic formations appropriate for sequestration).
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RIGHTS AND ASSOCIATED LIABILITY 66-70 (2005), available at http://www.climatechange.gov.au/ccs/
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national economy.126 CCS facilities are unlikely to be of national economic
importance in the sense of industry earnings, at least initially.
CCS facilities may meet the national significance standard as a means
to mitigate climate change. In Specialised Transport, the NCC considered
the strategic importance of a rail line used for transporting grain, coal, and
steel against the background of the commercial importance of those
industries.127 Similarly, one could argue that CCS enables the continued
viability of energy generation from fossil fuels, which would by extension
make CCS infrastructure nationally important. Or, if a court reasons that
climate change has a negative impact on Australia’s economy, then
infrastructure playing a role in mitigating climate change may be nationally
significant. The application of this criterion depends upon the interpretation
a particular regulator gives to national significance.
4.

Access to CCS Infrastructure Will Not Pose Unusual Safety Risks

Under the fourth criterion, access to a service cannot be declared if
doing so would pose an undue risk to human health or safety.128 This
criterion focuses on whether new operators would pose some novel risk to
safety. In Sydney International, the NCC was unconvinced that a small
freight handler would, simply as a function of its size, be less safe than
existing handlers.129 In Specialised Transport, the NCC reasoned that
existing regulations governing the rail transport would suffice to ensure that
the access seeker would operate safely.130 Because access to CCS
infrastructure will simply amount to either transmitting or sequestering
carbon dioxide, there is no reason to think that access will pose safety risks
so long as the infrastructure has unused capacity to sell.
Under the fifth criterion, the Minister may not declare a service under
Part IIIA if another “effective” access regime already regulates the
service.131 This criterion observes the states’ right to create their own access
regimes. No such regime exists or has been proposed for CCS.
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Brenda Marshall & Rachael Mulheron, Access to “Essential Facilities” Under Part IIIA of the
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Declaration of CCS Infrastructure May Be in the “Public’s Interest”

Finally, Part IIIA requires that declaring the service will not be
contrary to the “public interest.”132 In its recommendations, the NCC
mentions a number of factors that it considers when determining whether
access serves the public interest.133 Many of these seem to bleed into the
other five criteria; for example, the NCC will consider “policies” concerning
“occupational health” and “the competitiveness of Australian businesses.”134
However, the NCC has explained that the many factors captured within the
public interest criterion were intended to address the “net impact of
declaration on economic efficiency.”135
In evaluating applications under this criterion, the NCC has explicitly
considered a few factors that are particularly relevant to CCS. The NCC has
made clear that the public has an interest in promoting ecologically
sustainable development.136 This factor strongly supports declaration of
CCS services because the Australian government has identified CCS as a
part of its strategy for economically sustainable development.137 However,
the NCC has also indicated that its declaration recommendations will be
sensitive to the broader economic context.138 The NCC’s guiding principles
set out regional economic development as an important component of the
public interest.139 The NCC added another dimension to this component in
Re Australian Cargo Terminal Operations Pty Ltd, where it considered
whether declaration would “undermine the investment environment
necessary for significant competition.”140 If declaration of CCS services
represents a regulatory risk, then declaration may not be in the public’s
interest. These factors identify the tension within the sixth criterion.
Ultimately, the determination under this criterion will be fact-based and
somewhat subjective.141
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Larger CCS Infrastructure Projects Will Be Better Declaration
Candidates

Applying each of the six criteria on a theoretical basis does not
resolve the question of whether the CCS industry as a category will be
subject to declaration under Part IIIA of the TPA. Ultimately, the individual
character of a service will determine whether declaration is appropriate. Yet,
the criteria draw out some general themes that are important to third-party
access to CCS services and infrastructure.
First, CCS pipelines and storage sites are more likely to exhibit the
characteristics of natural monopoly.142 As a result, where a single entity
controls CCS transmission or sequestration, increased access to that service
will likely promote competition in upstream and downstream markets. The
basic characteristics of the CCS industry then raise the prospect of
declaration for investors considering CCS projects.
Second, CCS as an industry raises somewhat novel questions for the
national significance criterion.143 An analysis that focuses narrowly on the
size of CCS facilities and the revenues they generate may not find that CCS
facilities qualify. However, to the degree that the analysis considers the role
CCS plays in the broader economic context, as a process that reduces the
negative impacts of burning fossil fuels, CCS facilities may be deemed
nationally significant. The malleability of the third criterion makes it
unclear whether CCS services and facilities will meet its requirements.
Third, Australia’s “public interest” is necessarily a heterogeneous
concept and eludes straightforward application. The public interest may
change with political tides. For example, if the new government pursues an
aggressive emissions reduction strategy, will that represent the evolving
public interest? Even more troubling, the application of the public interest
criterion will change depending on the timeframe considered. Imagine that
one CCS pipeline exists to serve a particular urban area and that it presently
meets demand for transport services. Over the near term, declaring the CCS
service and subjecting the pipeline to third-party access would likely provide
a net benefit to competition in related CCS service markets. Additionally,
regulators would likely view declaration as a way to support ecologically
sustainable development. However, forcing CCS pipeline operators to
submit to access may dissuade other potential competitors from building
competing pipelines. Over the long term, declaring an individual CCS
service may stunt the wider development of the industry. The competing
142
143

See supra Part III.B.
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visions of the public interest incorporated within the sixth criterion make a
prediction about declaration for CCS services and facilities very difficult.
The most important, albeit limited, conclusion to be drawn from the
foregoing analysis is that the larger the CCS infrastructure, the more likely it
is to be subject to declaration. The larger the infrastructure, the more
difficult it will be to duplicate it under the second criterion. Likewise, under
the national significance and public interest criteria, larger infrastructure fits
the declaration criteria more easily. This result is somewhat troubling for
two reasons. First, if CCS is to develop on a significant scale, large projects
will be critical to establish a backbone of infrastructure. Second, to the
degree that the prospect of declaration deters investment, entrepreneurs will
be reluctant to embark on large CCS infrastructure projects.
Ultimately, applying the criteria to the CCS context results in a great
deal of uncertainty. Part IIIA’s criteria do not provide clear enough guidance
for whether and when CCS services will be declared. The next Section
explores one possible method to avoid this uncertainty, which is to develop
an industry specific access regime for CCS. However, as the next Section
makes clear, an industry regime for CCS would not eliminate uncertainty for
CCS investors because of the many unknowns that still remain for the
industry.
IV.

THE GAS CODE PROVIDES DETAILED RULES TO GOVERN THIRD-PARTY
ACCESS TO PIPELINES

The Gas Code is a prominent example of an industry specific access
regime “certified” under Part IIIA. The criteria for “coverage” under the
Gas Code are largely identical to the “declaration” criteria of Part IIIA.144 In
addition, the Gas Code requires the operators of “covered” pipelines to set
terms of access and conduct their operations according to strict principles.145
A similar access regime might be created for CCS to avoid some of the
vagaries of Part IIIA. However, the next three Sections identify the hazards
of implementing an industry specific code for CCS.
A.

State Regimes Must Be “Certified” to Supplant Part IIIA

States may also develop their own access regimes. A regime must be
certified by the appropriate Commonwealth minister to become “effective”
144
National Access Code for Natural Gas Pipeline Systems (1997) at 4, available at
http://www.coderegistrar.sa.gov.au/attachments2/codeC4.pdf.
145
Id. at 8-9.
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for purposes of Part IIIA.146 If the Treasurer certifies a state’s access regime,
the services and facilities covered by the state regime are no longer subject
to declaration under Part IIIA.147 That minister may only certify a state
regime if it conforms to the principles of Part IIIA.148 Typically state
regimes are tailored to the needs of one industry, its economics, its services,
and its facilities.149 By narrowing the scope of application, state access laws
supply more meaningful guidance to market participants in the particular
industry.
No state-based access regime has yet been proposed to govern CCS
services and facilities. However, as the industry develops, a narrower
approach to access regulation may have advantages. A comprehensive statebased access regime would increase predictability for potential investors.
Yet, with detail comes increased compliance costs. The following Section
will discuss the major features of the Gas Code to identify the costs
associated with it.
B.

The Contours of the Gas Code Parallel Those of Part IIIA

The Gas Code became law as part of South Australia’s Gas Pipelines
Access Act of 1997.150 The other Australian states and the Commonwealth
passed identical laws to establish a uniform national access regime.
Australia enacted the Gas Code with a few primary objectives in mind.
First, the Gas Code was intended to create a transparent process to facilitate
third-party access to natural gas pipelines.151 Second, by creating such a
process, the Gas Code was intended to facilitate the development of a
national, integrated gas pipeline network.152 Third, the Gas Code was
intended to prevent the abuse of monopoly power, promote competition
within the gas market, and provide for resolution of access disputes.153
The Gas Code only regulates access to those pipelines that have been
approved for coverage.154 At its inception, a large number of pipelines were
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expressly covered by the Gas Code.155 New pipelines may also be added if
an application meets the coverage criteria.156 The Gas Code does not
address access issues surrounding facilities upstream from gas pipelines.
Nor does it pertain to “any tanks, reservoirs, machinery, or
equipment . . . downstream of the connection point to a consumer.”157 The
Gas Code applies only to the transmission segment of the natural gas market.
The criteria for “coverage” under the Gas Code are largely the same
as the criteria for “declaration” under Part IIIA of the TPA. Just like Part
IIIA, the Gas Code requires the following: 1) coverage must promote
competition in another market; 2) the pipeline must not be economical to
duplicate; 3) the requested access must not compromise human health or
safety, and; 4) the requested access must not be contrary to the public
interest.158 Under the Gas Code there is no requirement that the pipeline be
of national significance. By eliminating the nebulous national significance
requirement, the Gas Code puts pipeline operators on notice that regulators
may permit access to any size pipeline. Defining the scope of coverage
should, in theory, reduce uncertainty for service providers and allow for
better investment decisions.
Once coverage has been approved under the Gas Code, the owner of
the pipeline must publish an “access arrangement” setting the terms of
access to the pipeline.159 The access arrangement must specify the service
covered, the terms and conditions governing supply of that service, and the
tariffs that will be charged for the service.160 The tariff or price of access
under the agreement must be set at an “efficient” level that “replicates” the
price of a competitive market without distorting investment decisions in
related markets.161 The access agreement must be published along with
information concerning spare pipeline capacity and the procedure for
making access requests.162 The Gas Code also requires that covered
pipelines be separated operationally for accounting purposes, or as it calls it,
by a “ring fence” from other “related businesses” that the owner runs.163
This “ring fencing” obligation is intended to prevent operators from giving
preferential terms to related businesses.
155
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The Gas Code Imposes a Heavy Regulatory Burden

The Gas Code’s operational and reporting obligations impose a
substantial regulatory burden on pipeline operators. The ACT admits that a
decision to cover a pipeline can have major commercial implications for the
owner or operator of the pipeline.”164 In part, this is a result of the “detailed
requirements as to the terms of [a]ccess [a]rrangements” and related
reporting obligations.165 The burden also results from the “quite detailed
provisions as to how a service provider is to ‘ring fence’ its pipeline
activities from other operations.”166 The benefits of more comprehensive
access requirements must be evaluated in light of these increased
compliance costs.
At least one company viewed the strictures of the Gas Code with such
distaste that it preemptively filed an application for an undertaking under
Part IIIA to avoid coverage.167 In general terms, the company argued that
the Gas Code effectively prohibits a company from setting prices at a level
and for a duration that ensure a fair return on investment.168 First, it argued
that the Gas Code’s “cost of service” approach to price setting did not
capture the real cost of providing pipeline services. Pricing should not
reflect merely the cost of providing a service, but should also consider, and,
reward a service provider based on the risk inherent to the venture.169
Second, the company argued that it should be allowed to set a longer pricing
schedule—twenty years—than the term typically approved by regulators—
five years.170 Third, the company argued that it should be permitted to set
prices below cost initially to attract business and above cost over the long
term to recoup early losses.171 A recent trend of applications to revoke
coverage of pipelines bears out the legitimacy of these frustrations.172
Parts III and IV of this Comment examined two mechanisms for
regulating third-party access under Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act. Part
III argued that the declaration criteria are too ambiguous to supply reliable
164
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prospective guidance for private investors considering CCS projects. Part
IV reviewed the third-party access code enacted to govern natural gas
pipelines to highlight the burdens associated with such an approach. Part V
argues that both these approaches to third-party access regulation under Part
IIIA deter investment, and that Australia should exempt CCS from Part IIIA
to provide CCS investors with clear expectations prior to beginning a major
CCS infrastructure project.
V.

AUSTRALIA SHOULD EXEMPT CCS FROM PART IIIA TO INDUCE
INVESTMENT

In order to foster CCS, Australia should critically evaluate the
deterrence effect Part IIIA will have on investment. As an alternative to the
general provisions of Part IIIA, Australia could establish an industry specific
regime for CCS, but doing so would be premature and would create a
significant regulatory burden. Instead, Australia should allow for some kind
of exemption vehicle under Part IIIA and use it to shelter CCS.
A.

Australia Must Consider Part IIIA’s Implications for Investment

As Australia formulates its approach to third-party access for CCS, it
should consider what impacts potential access regimes will have on
investment in the industry. Arguably, Part IIIA will increase predictability
for CCS investors by ensuring that participants in one market, like
transmission, have access to other related markets, like sequestration.
However, access issues only arise once infrastructure exists. To the extent
Part IIIA dissuades investment, access issues are secondary. Australia
should focus on addressing the regulatory risk associated with Part IIIA as it
impacts CCS. First, the ambiguity of the declaration criteria generates
uncertainty for investors considering a new infrastructure project. Second,
the discretionary powers given to regulators to set access terms make it
difficult for investors to gauge the likely rate of return for their projects.
B.

Creating an Industry-Specific Regime for CCS is Premature

Part IV discussed how the Gas Code works to increase predictability
for natural gas pipeline operators. First, the Gas Code applies only to a
single well-defined industry.173 Second, the Gas Code contains detailed
guidance for access seekers and service providers by streamlining the
173
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criteria for coverage, requiring pipeline operators to publish access
arrangements, and by establishing detailed guidelines for setting access.174
An industry specific regime for CCS could benefit the industry by
avoiding the vagaries of Part IIIA and increasing predictability. For
example, if CCS is of national significance as an industry, it might make
sense to extend coverage to all CCS infrastructure where access would
promote competition as does the Gas Code. A CCS Code could be limited in
scope to the services likely to exhibit natural monopoly characteristics—
pipelines and sequestration sites. Because the markets for transmission and
sequestration will be closely tied, clear rules defining access rights between
the two would tend to promote investment in both markets.
The problem with developing an industry-specific CCS Code is that
no CCS industry yet exists. The need for access regulation is, at this point,
purely speculative. The costs of CCS projects and services are relatively
unknown. The future demand for CCS services depends upon when and
how Australia regulates emissions. Too little is known about CCS to justify
a detailed approach to access. As discussed in Section IV, the Gas Code also
imposes a substantial regulatory burden on pipeline operators. While
compliance costs are tolerated in industries with demonstrated profitability,
such costs would be abortive for CCS.
In 2004, the Productivity Commission conducted a review of the Gas
Code (“Gas Code Report”) in which it highlighted this regulatory burden
and its effects on investment.175 The Gas Code Report noted that the criteria
for coverage under the Gas Code created the same type of regulatory
uncertainty as do the declaration criteria under Part IIIA.176 The Gas Code
Report also reviewed scholarship in the natural gas industry in an effort to
determine empirically whether the Gas Code has stunted pipeline
investment. Ultimately, the authors of the Gas Code Report could not
determine whether the Gas Code had depressed investment in new pipeline
infrastructure.177 However, they did conclude that the Gas Code was likely
to distort investment away from riskier projects.178 Two reasons explain
why investors would be unlikely to take on riskier pipeline projects. First,
regulators who set the terms of access to pipelines have no way to
“distinguish between competitive pipelines that experience better than
174
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expected outcomes and pipelines that are exerting market power.”179
Second, investors believe that regulators will not award higher profits for
riskier projects because they are biased in favor of consumers and access
seekers.180
C.

The Regulatory Risk Endemic to Part IIIA Deters Investment

As demonstrated in Part III of this Comment, applying Part IIIA’s
declaration criteria to the CCS industry does not produce a clear sense of
whether CCS services and facilities will be subjected to its requirements. In
part, this flows from the ambiguity inherent to the criteria. The national
significance and public interest tests are particularly problematic. Both these
criteria are somewhat subjective and may be prone to inconsistent
application, either by different regulatory bodies, or because of a change in
political climate.
In part, this regulatory uncertainty flows from the unknowns of the
CCS industry. First, because CCS technology and methodology have not
been fully commercialized, the economies of scale for the CCS industry are
not yet clear. Without knowing, for instance, whether carbon dioxide
separation will be a centralized service, it is hard to predict whether
separation facilities will meet the declaration criteria. Second, a great deal
of work remains to be done in locating good sequestration sites and
determining their capacities. The availability of sites will shape the industry
and determine whether CCS infrastructure will exhibit natural monopoly
characteristics. If it appears that markets will tend to be served most
efficiently by multiple pipelines and sequestration sites, the whole
discussion of Part IIIA may be moot because the market for CCS services
would likely be competitive.
In part, regulatory uncertainty results from the language and design of
Part IIIA. In 2001, the Productivity Commission published a comprehensive
evaluation of Part IIIA (“IIIA Report”).181 The IIIA Report admits the
continued need for a national access regime, but also identifies a number of
deficiencies in the regime that should be addressed. In the words of the
Commission, “[M]ost importantly, the national access regime does not do
enough to guard against the possibility that investment in essential
infrastructure will be deterred.”182
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The IIIA Report begins by noting that the facilities contemplated by
Part IIIA are large and costly.183 Where the life of a project spans decades
and the capital costs are in the many millions, any regulatory risk raises
serious concerns for investors. Once the piece of infrastructure is built, the
costs are sunk and must be recovered through user fees. In the context of
these immense projects, the potential that Part IIIA will ultimately dictate
how a service provider operates may dampen investment.184
The IIIA Report also suggests that regulators tend to take the side of
access seekers when they set the terms of access to services.185 To induce
investment, a project must promise returns in proportion to the risk involved.
As the IIIA Report points out: “once a facility is operating, it will be
impossible for regulators to delineate any upside returns from monopoly
rent—that is, returns in excess of those necessary to justify the
investment.”186 In other words, what a regulator sees is a facility that makes
money. The regulator does not tend to consider the alternative scenario in
which the facility fails as a business venture.
D.

The 2006 Amendment to Part IIIA Did Not Go Far Enough to Redress
the Deterrent Effect of Part IIIA on Investment

The parliament responded to the Part IIIA Report by passing the Trade
Practices Amendment (National Access Regime) Act of 2006 (“2006
Amendment”).187 This amendment included a number of measures to clarify
Part IIIA’s purpose and application. A new subsection, 44AA, added an
“objects” clause to make as clear as possible the purpose motivating Part
IIIA: “To promote the economically efficient operation of, use of and
investment in infrastructure . . . .”188 The 2006 Amendment also tweaked the
language of the first declaration criteria to raise the threshold for declaration.
The word “material” was added so that 44G now reads in relevant part:
“Access . . . to the service [must] promote a material increase in
competition.”189

183

See id. at xix.
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Second Reading Speech, Trade Practices Amendment (National Access Regime) Act of 2006,
available
at
http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb//view_document.aspx?TABLE=HANSARDS&ID=
2308433.
188
Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. IIIA, § 44AA (Austl.).
189
Id. § 44G.
184

434

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 17 NO. 2

The 2006 Amendment also established a set of pricing principles to
guide regulators in setting the terms of access.190 Section 44ZZCA reads in
relevant part: “[A]ccess prices should be set as to generate expected
revenue . . . that is at least sufficient to meet efficient costs . . . and include a
return on investment commensurate with regulatory and commercial risks
involved.”191 It also provides that “access pricing structures should allow
multi-part pricing and price discrimination when it aids efficiency.”192
These revisions are a laudable effort to improve the workability of
Part IIIA and an appropriate response to the IIIA Report. However, they also
underscore the tension inherent to this type of competition law between
market efficiency and social equity. The new objects clause of 44G did
clarify the purpose of Part IIIA, but it did not eliminate the difficulty of
applying the law in practice.
Subsection 44G mentions economic efficiency with regard to three
elements: the use of, the operation of, and the investment in infrastructure.
Efficiency will be defined somewhat differently when considered from each
of these three perspectives. When the user reads efficient, it understands
cheaper. When the operator reads efficient, it understands more expensive.
When the concept of efficiency is applied to investment at the societal level
it necessarily invites an inquiry into concepts of the public good. Do we
mean the efficient level that allows universal access? Or, do we mean the
efficient level to ensure a robust investment climate? This same tension
crops up in 44ZZCA, albeit to a lesser extent. Price structures “should allow
multi-part pricing and price discrimination when it aids efficiency.”193
Again, the language begs the question: efficiency from whose point of view?
In light of these tensions, it is unclear to what extent the 2006 Amendment
will actually result in greater predictability for industry.
E.

Part IIIA Should Be Amended to Allow Access Holidays

Though the 2006 Amendment made significant improvements, it did
not adopt the Productivity Commission’s recommendations wholesale. The
IIIA Report recommended that Part IIIA be amended to establish a
mechanism for investors to determine the applicability of the declaration
criteria before embarking on a project.194 The IIIA Report argued that such
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prospective rulings would allow investors to move forward with increased
confidence.195 Part IIIA does not provide for prospective rulings.196
The IIIA Report also recommended further research into the
exemption of projects from Part IIIA.197 It called the case for implementing
a mechanism to redress the deterrent affects of Part IIIA “compelling” and
“imperative” and hoped that a scheme would be in place by 2003.198 In the
Productivity Commission’s view, such a change is critically important
because it would generate certainty for business prior to making an
investment.199
One mechanism considered by the IIIA Report, called an “Access
Holiday,” would preclude declaration of a piece of infrastructure under Part
IIIA for a defined period of time. In considering the problem of regulatory
risk, Gans and King demonstrate that access holidays can be a simple and
effective approach to exemption where regulators cannot commit in advance
to fair terms of access.200 Access holidays work in a way similar to patents
by creating a limited period of time during which the owner has an
unfettered ability to set prices as it wishes. For industries without
demonstrated economics, like CCS, access holidays would eliminate
regulatory risk.
F.

Australia Should Exempt CCS in the Near Term to Encourage
Entrepreneurial Investment

Australia should exempt CCS from Part IIIA until the industry
develops to the point where it becomes clear that subjecting it to a thirdparty access regime would benefit society. At present, any benefits of
applying third-party access law in the CCS context are speculative whereas
its detriments are relatively clear. Leaving CCS exposed to Part IIIA would
deter investment. Generally, the deterrent effect of Part IIIA exacerbates the
uncertainties particular to CCS. More specifically, the national significance
criterion of Part IIIA might deter investors from pursuing large CCS
projects. If CCS is to develop on a significant scale, large projects will be
essential for creating a backbone for the industry to develop around. The
multifarious nature of the public interest criterion also leaves investors
195
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uncertain of whether a potential project will be subject to declaration. A
CCS investor may well worry that a regulator’s particular breed of public
interest will result in a project’s declaration.
The regulatory uncertainties generated by Part IIIA cannot be resolved
by creating an industry specific regime for CCS. First, the character and
economics of the industry are unclear so that creating a detailed access code
is premature. Second, at this stage of development, CCS investment
continues to be an entrepreneurial activity and as such it would not bear the
regulatory burden created by a comprehensive access regime. Third,
experience with the Gas Code demonstrates that even detailed access codes
suffer from a degree of regulatory uncertainty that may distort investment.
The 2006 Amendment recognized, and in part redressed, the negative
impact Part IIIA has on infrastructure investments, but it didn’t go far
enough. The addition of clear pricing principles was a boon that should
ensure more favorable access terms in the future that account for investment
and regulatory risks. More than likely though, investors will continue to
expect, and rightly so, that regulators will underestimate such risks when
they are evaluated ex post in light of a functioning and successful project.
The objects clause also helps by stating unequivocally the purpose of Part
IIIA. This addition may enhance uniformity across regulatory bodies, but
that remains to be seen. Ultimately though, these measures fall short
because they do not give true ex ante certainty to investors.
Parliament should act on the Productivity Commission’s critique of
Part IIIA by allowing for prospective rulings and creating some mechanism
for exempting projects under Part IIIA. The simplest way to exempt CCS
projects would be to grant access holidays. This approach has numerous
benefits. First, it will avoid the deterrent effects on investment associated
with the regulatory risk of Part IIIA. Second, it would avoid the regulatory
burden associated with an industry specific access code. Third, it would
signal to potential investors that the Australian government intends CCS to
play an important role in mitigating climate change. Finally, access holidays
would allow companies to contract with each other freely without fear that
prices or terms will be imposed unexpectedly.
It is also worth pointing out that the dangers from a laissez-faire
approach to CCS access regulation are minimal because there will be little
ability for CCS operators to reap monopoly profits.201 In the natural gas
201
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industry, consumers cannot easily substitute gas for another product. People
need it to heat their homes, produce chemicals, generate electricity, and
support manufacturing. Where only one company sells gas, it may well
have substantial power to set prices because, at least in the near term,
consumers have no real alternative to buying the gas. By contrast, in the
context of CCS, government regulation will set the price of emitting carbon
dioxide. The level of the Australian carbon cap will establish the practical
ceiling for prices in the CCS service markets. Emitters will always face a
choice between emitting carbon dioxide and paying the associated penalty,
and paying the CCS service provider its fee. As a result, CCS service
providers will have little ability to leverage market power above the
government determined emission price.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Comment has considered how Part IIIA of the Trade Practices
Act will impact the nascent CCS industry. Although some markets for CCS
services will exhibit characteristics of natural monopoly, leaving CCS
exposed to Part IIIA is unwise. Part IIIA creates regulatory uncertainty and
would deter investment in CCS infrastructure. An industry specific code
might reduce uncertainty, but the CCS industry has not developed enough to
permit such an approach. If Australia wants to induce investment in the
area, it should exempt CCS from Part IIIA. This approach avoids the
regulatory risks and burdens associated with Part IIIA and would allow CCS
to develop organically.

